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ISSUE PAPER
The Role of Monopolization and Abuse of
Dominance in Competition Law
By Spencer Weber Waller*
We begin our roundtable discussion with a very simple
question. Is Monopolization or the Abuse of Dominance a matter of
equal concern in competition law to collusion and other agreements
by two or more persons which harm competition?
The history of competition law suggests that these are matters
of equal concern, although modem practice suggests that cartels may
have replaced monopolies as "public enemy number 1." As a textual
matter, Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are treated equally in
terms of importance, remedies, and private rights of action. In the
United States, monopoly and trusts were used largely interchangeably
in the debates leading up to the enactment of the Sherman Act. The
two sections of the Sherman Act were further used largely
interchangeably in the early cases brought by the United States
government and decided by the Supreme Court. To a large extent, it
was assumed that violations of Section 1 were the means by which
monopolization was achieved.
The same is true in the European Union with Articles 81 and
82 of the Treaty. The two competition offenses have equal textual
importance, equal remedies, and similar non-exclusive lists of
violations laid out in the Treaty itself. In the broader history of the
ordo-liberal tradition that informs EU competition law, both
conspiracy and abuse offenses would seemingly threaten the
envisioned democratic market economy and political order.
From one perspective, monopolization may be even more
pernicious than cartelization. To the extent that cartels are merely an
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imperfect group's attempt to achieve the output restrictions and price
increases of a true monopolist, but prone to defections and cheating,
we may well have less to fear from conspiracies to harm competition
than full blown individual monopolization of a particular market.
Moreover, the
Sherman Act prohibits
even attempted
monopolization, an approach absent from Section 1 jurisprudence.
From the European perspective, there is the additional "special
responsibility" of dominant firms to avoid the abuse of their power
not found in the analysis of Article 81 offenses. The EU also has the
provisions of Article 86 to prohibit the misuse of governmental and
governmentally conferred monopolies, also suggesting a higher
priority for the abuse of a dominant position.
However, I am unaware of any lasting view of monopolies as
more pernicious than their conspiracy cousins. At common law,
conspiracies were always viewed as more dangerous than individual
conduct and treated more harshly by penalizing the agreement itself
rather than the completed act.
In more modern terms, this greater suspicious of conspiracies
to harm competition is reinforced with competition law's greater
emphasis on efficiencies and other theories which tend to view
monopolies in more benign terms. Cartels are deemed to be
horizontal agreements between competitors to set price or production
levels or to allocate territories or customers. They lack any
significant integrative features, or the potential for the generation of
any significant efficiencies, or they would not be treated as per se
unlawful in the first place. In contrast, a successful monopolist is
often deemed to be the source of considerable efficiencies and/or the
driver of significant innovation, as in Schumpeter's world of waves
of creative destruction. At the extreme, one with such views might
consider even enduring market power as either a sign of initial
mismeasurement or satisfaction of consumer needs warranting no
further action until new or existing market actors supplant the
incumbent. Few view cartels in such similar complacent terms.
In the United States, at least, it seems the balance has tipped
solidly in favor of viewing monopolies as less problematic than
cartels and similar anticompetitive agreements. First, cartels are
vigorously prosecuted as criminal offenses, while at the same time
there has been no criminal prosecution of monopolization or
attempted monopolization since the mid-1960s. There have always
been far more greater number of Section 1 then Section 2 cases,
although many cases combine elements of both offenses and pure
Section 2 are significantly larger and more complex in scope than the
average conspiracy case.
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Since the U.S. Microsoft case has been settled, the focus of
government monopolization efforts has been centered in the FTC
around the notion of "cheap predation," where there is broad
ideological consensus that the misuse of governmental and standard
setting processes is a legitimate cause of concern and that an easily
administered behavioral remedy is available. There also have been
few recent government monopolization cases which have been tried
to a verdict. Most have been resolved through consenL decrees. This
has important ramifications for the private enforcement of the US
antitrust laws since private cases frequently track government
enforcement efforts, both for practical reasons and in order to take
advantage of the preclusive effects of a government court victory.
All these developments seemed to have come to a head in the
United States in the Trinko decision where the Court referred to
collusion as the "supreme evil" and noted in contrast:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least
for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the
first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation
and economic growth.'
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in its 2001 Microsoft opinion
seemed to assume quite the opposite in treating monopolization and
anticompetitive agreements as equivalent harms to the competitive
harms and fashioned tests for unlawful monopolization almost
identical to the
2 test for rule of reason cases under Section 1 of the
Act.
Sherman
The European Union is wrestling with these same issues of
priority in law and enforcement between Articles 81 and 82. The
European Commission is in the seemingly final stages of issuing
guidelines for the application of Article 82 and its prohibition of the
abuse of a dominant position. The Court of First Instance has now
further weighed in with its September 17 th decision in the EU
Microsoft litigation.
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The basic notion of whether monopolization or an abuse of
dominance should be viewed more suspiciously, equally, or as a
matter of less concern than other parts of competition law is a
fundamental one that influences all the key questions that follow of
defining power and harm, what constitutes an offense, and what
remedies should be applied.

